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VALIDITY OF THE NEBRASKA
REVERTER ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Reverter Act1  operates retrospectively to
abrogate both possibilities of reverter in the future and also pos-
sibilities of reverter created before the statute in an attempt to
aid the marketability of titles to real estate. The purpose of this
comment is to analyze the many questions raised by the act upon
which its constitutionality may one day be litigated. Following
a discussion of the problem that the Reverter Act was intended
to remedy and a review of legislative history, the following ques-
tions will be discussed:
(1) Does the Reverter Act take property unconstitutionally?
(2) Does the Reverter Act repeal existing Nebraska law?
(3) Does the Reverter Act unconstitutionally impair the ob-
ligations of contracts?
(4) Is the Reverter Act unconstitutional on the ground that
it constitutes special legislation?
(5) Are the provisions of the Reverter Act capable of sev-
erance if a portion of the Act is held unconstitutional?
Possibilities of reverter 2 and rights of entry for condition
broken 3 have become means of imposing restrictions on the use
of land. These restrictions, being outside the operation of the
I NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-299 - 2,105 (Supp.1959).
2 "[A] possibility of reverter is a Teversionary interest because it is
something which the instrument leaves in the grantor, hence it is a
future interest left in the grantor . . ." A right of entry for condition
broken ". . . is not something left in the grantor. It is a right to
re-enter-hence a power of termination. It is a contingent right of
re-entry and is not an interest in the premises." Fike, Problems
Relating To Stale Reverters and Restrictions, 38 NEB. L. REV. 150
at 155 (1959).
3 A possibility of reverter is a future interest created in the grantor of
a determinable fee. A right of entry is a future interest created in
the grantor of a fee on condition subsequent. A possibility of reverter
takes effect automatically upon the occurrence of the event on which
the determinable fee is limited whereas a right of entry does not take
effect automatically, but only when the holder of the right brings
legal action to recover the land upon the forfeiting event. See Equiv-
alence of Right of Entry and Right of Reverter, 18 OHIO ST. L. J.
120 (1957).
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rule against perpetuities, 4 outlive their usefulness and impair
both the alienability and the development of land.5
The law allows these restrictions primarily because it feels
that a property owner should be permitted to place whatever
restrictions he so desires on his property when he conveys it. 6
The restrictions may be imposed for a variety of reasons. The
owner of a large tract may wish to convey a part of it and pro-
tect his enjoyment of the part retained. Thus he may insert
restrictive covenants in the grant, or reserve easements appurten-
ant to the land retained. The grantor may make a gift to a
charitable corporation to be used in a particular way, and may
desire to get the land back if the use should ever cease.7  One of
the most common uses of reverter clauses is found in the sale of
lots in new urban subdivisions. The land may be restricted only
to residence purposes; or the character, value, and location of
buildings to be erected may be restricted in great detail.
The restrictions, however, tend to become obsolete. For ex-
ample, in Lancaster County a restriction limited an entire addi-
tion to residential and church purposes. At the time, the addition
consisted entirely of homes and a church. Years later the city's
growth changed the surrounding territory so that it became com-
mercial in nature and is now suitable only for business purposes.
The church, wanting a new location, was unable to sell the property
to a group wishing to convert the church building into a community
theatre because of the reverter provision in the deed restricting
the land to church purposes only.8
Thus title remains forever subject to being defeated in the
event that the restrictions are violated. These restrictions become
4 SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, § 1239 (2d
ed. 1956). In England the right of re-entry is subject to the rule against
perpetuities. See Gray, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§ 310,
312 (4th ed. 1942).
5 The problem has been discussed and remedial legislation recommended.
See Fike, supra note 2; Williams, Restrictive Covenants With Reverter
Clauses, 31 NEB. L. REV. 201 (1951). Goldstein, Rights of Entry and
Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54
HARV. L. REV. 248 (1940).
0 See Simes, Elimination of Stale Restrictions on the Use of Land, A.B.A.
PROC. Real Property Law (1954).
7 E.g. "I convey Blackacre to X Church for so long as it shall be used
for church purposes, but title will revert to the grantor if it ceases
to be so used."
s This case is discussed in 38 NEB. L. REV. 150 at 156 (1959).
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a clog on the alienability of land. The price to society is the
hindrance to the marketability and improvement of real estate.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Nebraska Legislature first sought to curtail the validity
of reverter clauses in 1957. However, L. B. 200, sponsored by the
State Bar Association, was killed in the judiciary committee. The
bill attempted to set a cut-off date beyond which reverter rights
would not be recognized or maintainable in law. The committee
felt that while there was some merit in the purpose of the bill,
its passage might result in an unjust limitation of the right of a
grantor to place such a reverter clause in an instrument transfer-
ring titleY
Similar legislation, however, was soon recommended. Accord-
ing to a recent Nebraska Law Review article: 10
L. B. 200 ... met with a sudden and violent death...
and it was this circumstance which prompted the request for this
paper ... titles are impaired by stale. . . restrictions which affect
marketability .... It is proper for legislatures to require those
owning interests in . . . restrictions which burden title, to be re-
quired to give some record notice of the continued existence of
such rights or suffer them to be extinguished.... just as the Rule
against Perpetuities had to come into play to curtail unbridled
freedom with respect to alienability of land titles, so must there
come into play some limiting rule to rid us of . .. the further
creation of . . . restrictions ... to further clog . . . our titles....
The only satisfactory solution lies in well-drawn legislation.
The legislature on May 15, 1959, passed L. B. 360, which is
known as the Nebraska Reverter Act." The bill provides in
effect that possibilities of reverter or rights of re-entry for breach
of condition subsequent shall be valid for not longer than thirty
years from the date of the creation thereof. If a right of reverter
has come into existence prior to the adoption of the act, the
person holding such reverter interest has one year from the ef-
9 "It was felt that it is safer, even though cumbersome, to rely on the
legal remedies of clearing title by a quiet title action or by waiver
of interested parties. Therefore the bill was indefinitely postponed by
a vote of 6 ayes and 1 not voting." Statement on L.B. 200 by Donald
S. McGinley, Chairman, Judiciary Committee, April 10, 1957.
10 Fike, Problems Relating to State Reverters and Restrictions, 38 NEB.
L. REV. 150 at 151 (1959).
11 L.B. 360 [NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-299 - 2,105 (Supp.1959)] is nearly
identical to L.B. 200 except that L.B. 360 specifically provides that
it does not apply to leases, mortgages, and grants to railroads or public
utilities.
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fective date of the act to assert it or his right of action is forever
barred. The act does not apply to leases, mortgages, and grants
to railroads or public utilities.
Only two states, Illinois1 2 and Florida,13 have adopted retro-
spective statutes'14 similar to the Nebraska law. The Illinois stat-
ute provides a time limitation of forty years15 while the Florida
statute limits possibilities of reverters to a duration of twenty-one
years. 16 The Illinois statute, attacked on the ground that it was
an ex post facto law, was held to be constitutionally valid by the
Illinois Supreme Court.17 The Florida statute, however, was held
to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it impairs the obliga-
tion of contracts and takes property without due process of law.' 8
Connecticut, Maine, and Rhode Island have statutes which set
time limits for the existence of possibilities of reverter and rights
of re-entry, but these statutes all operate prospectively. 9
III. DOES THE REVERTER ACT TAKE PROPERTY
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY?
Whether the act effects an unconstitutional taking hinges on
two questions:
(1) Is the interest taken vested or property; or does the act
merely operate as a statute of limitations to set a cut-off
date beyond which the remedy of recovering mere ex-
pectant interests is barred?
(2) If property or vested interests are involved, are they taken
in an unconstitutional manner?
The Illinois Supreme Court held valid a retroactive statute20
which operates identically to the Nebraska Act, on the ground
12 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 30 §§ 37b-h (1947).
13 Fla. Laws, § 689.18 (1951).
14 Validity of retroactive statutes in general is discussed in Hochman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).
15 The Illinois limitation was originally fifty years, but was amended in
1959 to forty years. See July 8, Laws 1959, S.B. No. 128 § 1.
16 Fla. Laws, § 689.18 (1951).
17 Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill.2d 486, 130
N.E.2d. 111 (1955). The case is criticized in U. ILL. L. F. 298 (1956).
Is Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954). This case is criti-
cized in 55 COLUM. L. REV. 235 (1955).
19 These statutes are discussed in 38 NEB. L. REV. 150 at 159 (1959).
20 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 30 §§ 37b-h (1947).
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that a reversion is merely a contingent, not a vested interest;
hence it is not a property right and is not taken unconstitutionally.
In Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf2 1 school dis-
tricts anticipating the sale of property formerly used for school
purposes brought a quiet title action to have reverter restrictions
in the deed declared invalid under the Illinois Reverter Act.22
Defendants objected on the grounds that the statute was ex post
facto legislation and violated both the state and federal due pro-
cess clauses. 23 The trial court held the statute unconstitutional.
On appeal, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held it constitu-
tional. The court was aided by a series of Illinois decisions which
spelled out the status of future interests in Illinois. These cases
established a possibility of reverter as being incapable of alien-
ation, devise or partition 24 and "until the limiting contingency
occurs it is . . no more than an expectation . . . subject to
change, modification, or abolition by legislative action.'2' ;
Would Nebraska follow Illinois and uphold the Reverter Act?
The Nebraska Supreme Court has treated a possibility of reverter
as being so remote and speculative that it could not be considered
in determining the value of land taken in condemnation pro-
ceedings.26 In Nebraska v. County of Cheyenne2 7 the court stated:
Until the determining event the proprietor of a determinable
estate has all the rights end privileges of an absolute owner. The
former owner retains at most a mere possibility of reverter should
the event happen upon which the estate is limited. A possibility
of reverter is not an estate in land but is only the possibility of
being an estate. It cannot have a value until it can be determined
that the event upon which the estate is limited will happen and
when it will occur.
If a possibility of reverter has no value the Nebraska court might
agree with Illinois that it does not constitute an existing interest
sufficient to be a property right.
21 6 I1l.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 11 (1955).
22 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 30 §§ 37b-h (1947).
23 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10 and amend. XIV.
24 Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church of Pleasant Grove v. Parker,
373 Ill. 607, 27 N.E.2d 522 (1940). Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 60, 112 N.E.
286 (1916).
25 Prall v. Burckhart, 299 IlM. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921).
26 Nebraska v. County of Cheyenne, 157 Neb. 533, 60 N.W.2d 593 (1953).
27 Id. at 536, 60 N.W.2d at 595. But cf. Addy v. Short, 47 Del. 157, 89
A.2d 136 (1952).
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The American Law of Property,23 however, states that:
[T]he very fact that a possibility of reverter is called a "pos-
sibility," shows that it is not regarded as vested. However, the
modern view is that, although it is contingent, it is an existing
interest, not a mere possibility that an interest will arise in the
future. (emphasis supplied).
When the grantor retains a possibility of reverter at the time he
conveys the deed, the property right retained, according to the
American Law of Property,29 is part of the fee simple.30 While
the possibility might have no value until the contingency occurs,
it must still be regarded as a property right if it is part of the
fee simple.
In Biltmore Village v. Royal3' the Florida Supreme Court
held a Florida statute,32 purporting to cancel all reverter provi-
sions which had been in effect more than twenty-one years, un-
constitutional as applied to the owner of a possibility of reverter
arising under a deed which specified that if the grantee failed to
comply with the restrictions the property should revert to the
grantor. The court, not overlooking the savings provisions of
the statute allowing the holder of a possibility of reverter one
year from the date of enactment to institute suit to enforce his
right,3 3 felt that this provision afforded no remedy to the grantor
28 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.12 (Simes ed. 1952).
29 Id.
30 W. BARTON LEACH, FUTURE INTERESTS 21 (2d ed. 1940), states:
"The possibility of reverter is a reversionary interest arising out of
the fact that the grantor gave away a smaller estate than he owned."
31 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954).
32 Fla. Laws, § 689.18 (1951).
33 This provision is identical to NEB. REV. STAT. § 76 - 2,103 (Supp.1959)
which states: "If by reason of a possibility of reverter created more
than thirty years prior to the effective date of this act, a reverter has
come into existence prior to the time of the effective date of this act,
no person shall commence an action for the recovery of land or any
part thereof based upon such possibility of reverter, after one year
from the effective date of this act.
"If by reason of a breach of a condition subsequent created more
than thirty years prior to the effective date of this act a right of
re-entry has come into existence prior to the time of the effective
date of this act, no person shall commence an action for the recovery
of the land or any part thereof based upon such right to entry or
re-entry after one year from the effective date of this act, unless en-
try or re-entry has been actually made to enforce said right before
the expiration of such year."
COMMENTS
if the restriction was not broken within one year from the act.
Thus the grantee would be able to acquire clear title to the prop-
erty one year after passage of the act, and then break the re-
striction.
The Florida court termed the right of reversion a "vested
right." The expression "vested right" within the meaning of
constitutional guarantees against infringement or impairment 4
is not usually restricted to any narrow meaning peculiar to the
law of real property, but rather embraces all interests which it
is proper for the state to recognize and protect.3
Minnesota recently held valid a marketable title statute", in
the case of Wichelman v. Messner.37 The statute provided that
a title searcher is not bound by the record of instruments which
would otherwise create restrictions on the title, unless such in-
struments were recorded within a fixed period of time. 8 This
case, however, would not appear to be authority for upholding
the validity of § 76-2,10339 of the Nebraska Act. The court stated:
"Marketable title acts merely require filing notice rather than
commencing action; hence they may apply to vested future
interests. ' 40 The court noted in dicta:
Retrospective legislation in general, however, will not be al-
lowed to impair rights which are vested and which constitute
property rights.[41] . . . If § 541.023[42] automatically barred a
34 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1875).
35 See the discussion in 11 AM. JUR., Constitutional Law § 370 (1937).
3G MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (1945).
37 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
3S The Minnesota statute utilizes the framework of a statute of limitations.
The action is barred as against a claim of title based upon a source
of title which source has then been of record at least forty years.
Compare the Nebraska Marketable Title Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§
76-288-98 (Reissue 1958) which states a factual situation in which
one is deemed to have a marketable title free and clear of all interests,
with a proviso that such old interests may be kept alive by the re-
cording of a simple preserving notice. The Minnesota statute in effect
distinguishes the old interest by barring any remedial steps in relation
thereto, while the Nebraska statute seems to directly destroy such
old claims and interests. The validity of the Nebraska statute has
never been tested.
39 See supra note 33.
40 Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 115, 83 N.W.2d 800, 821 (1957).
4' Id. at 107, 83 N.W.2d at 816.
42 MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (1945).
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vested right retroactively without providing an opportunity to
protect that interest, the . . . argument that vested . . . rights
cannot be barred would have considerably more force.[43 ] (em-
phasis by the court).
The Minnesota court distinguished the operation of its market-
able title statute from the Florida statute as follows: 44
[T]he provisions of the Florida statute should be distin-
guished from those of the Minnesota Marketable Title Act in that
the Minnesota act requires that the owner of the outstanding in-
terest shall merely be required to file his notice of claim, after
which the right to enforce the claim may continue to exist in-
definitely. In other words, we do not have before us a statute
which operates to bar the claimant's remedy before he has had
an opportunity to assert it.
Unlike Illinois, Nebraska has regarded possibilities of reverter
as being alienable.45 Simes and Smith46 argue that a possibility
of reverter should be regarded as alienable because:
(1) The possibility of reverter is difficult to distinguish from the
reversion, which is clearly alienable. To make one interest
alienable and the other inalienable would give rise to difficult
problems of construction in classifying interests.
(2) The recent cases tend strongly to favor alienability.
(3) No good reason is perceived why a possibility of reverter
should not be alienable if an executory interest can be con-
veyed.
According to the American Law of Real Property47 English courts
objected to alienability of future interests because contingent
future interests were regarded as mere expectancies and it was
feared that the free alienability of future interests would stir up
litigation. But today a future interest should be alienable because
contingent future interests are now regarded as existing estates.
Also, the notion that a rule permitting the free alienability of future
43 Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 115, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
44 Id. at 116, 83 N.W.2d at 822.
45 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-107 (Reissue 1956): "The conveyance of an
existing future interest, whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective
on the sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contin-
gent." This statute would appear to encompass possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry. RESTATEMENT, Property, § 165 (f) (1956) de-
clares: "When a statute declares any interest is devisable ... this
provision is to be construed as applying not only to reversions, remain-
ders, and executory interests, but also to powers of termination and
possibilities."
46 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 1860 (2d ed. 1956).
47 1 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 466 (Simes ed. 1952).
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interests would stir up litigation is obsolete. People do not pur-
chase contingent interests of doubtful validity.
Since Nebraska has regarded a possibility of reverter as be-
ing alienable it would appear that a reverter interest is a property
right. It is difficult to see how an interest which may be sold,
given, or devised can be held not to be property. However, the
Nebraska Reverter Act4s declares that a possibility of reverter is
a future interest and is not alienable. If a reversionary interest
ceases to be a property right merely because § 76-299 declares it
inalienable, the statute appears to take property without due
process of law.49
The Reverter Act, § 76-2,101,50 declares that a possibility of
reverter owned by a corporation ceases to exist upon dissolution
of the corporation. Simes, however, feels that to the extent that
the assets continue to be within the control of the corporation's
successors, a possibility of reverter should be treated as any other
asset.8 ' In Addy v. Short52 the Delaware Supreme Court held
that a possibility of reverter was not extinguished by the dissolu-
tion of the corporation, but that it was an actual property interest
belonging to the corporation.
Hence if a possibility of reverter is a property right, § 76-2,101
appears to take without due process, property which belongs to
the stockholders or creditors of the dissolved corporation. 3
Even if the Nebraska Supreme Court should choose to follow
the precedent established by the Illinois court,54 the Batdorf de-
48 The Reverter Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-299 (Supp.1959), provides:
"Possibilities of reverter or rights of entry or re-entry for breach of
condition subsequent are hereby declared to be future interests and
shall not be alienable or devisable; and no conveyance shall operate
in favor of the grantee or persons claiming under such grantee."
49 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1875).
50 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76- 2,101 (Supp.1959), provides: "When a corpo-
ration is dissolved or ceases to exist, any possibility of reverter and
any right of entry or re-entry for breach of condition subsequent
heretofore or hereafter reserved by or to the corporation and affecting
land in this state ceases and determines."
51 SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 46, § 1861.
52 8 Del. 157, 89 A.2d 136 (1952). But compare Nebraska v. County of
Cheyenne, 157 Neb. 533, 60 N.W.2d 593 (1953).
53 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 315 (2d ed. 1939): "... lands
belonging to . . . a corporation .. . are like other assets, distributed
among the stockholders, after payment of debts."
54 Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill.2d 486, 130
N.E.2d 111 (1955).
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cision would probably not control in a situation in which the
condition which would cause the property to revert to the grantor
would occur before the effective date of the Reverter Act. After
the Batdorf decision was handed down the case was criticized
and the view expressed that even in Illinois the constitutionality
of the statute might yet be litigated, since the court did not decide
whether the limiting contingency actually occurred before or
after the Reverter Act became effective.55 A recent law review
article stated: 56
If a case were later to arise in which it was more clearly
presented that the condition has occurred before the Reverter Act
became effective the court might be tempted to re-examine the
constitutionality of section 5, feeling that the instant case applied
only to section 4.57
After the terminating condition has occurred the grantor of a
possibility of reverter would have the fee title, and not merely
the possibility of regaining the fee.5s
Another ground that the statute takes property in an uncon-
stitutional manner is that it might serve a private rather than a
public purpose. In re Paileret's Appeal59 concerned a statute
seeking to abolish irredeemable ground rents by providing for
their purchase at a fair price to be determined in a judicial pro-
ceeding. The court held the statute unconstitutional because the
remedy was more in the interest of the private owner than the
55 The court stated: "If the abandonment took place after July 21, 1947,
the possibilties of reverter are invalid under section 4. If the abandon-
ment took place before July 21, 1947, section 5 bars defendants from
asserting any claim based on these possibilities of reverter in this
suit which was filed nearly three years after the effective date of this
act." Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill.2d 486,
490, 130 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1955).
56 U. ILL. L. F. 298 at 301 (1956).
r7 Section 5 of the Illinois statute is identical to NEB. REV. STAT. §
76- 2,103 (Supp.1959); see note 33 supra. Section 4 of the Illinois
statute is identical to NEB. REV. STAT. § 76 - 2,102 (Supp.1959) ex-
cept that Illinois provides a time limitation of forty years. Section
76-2,102 provides: "Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of
entry or re-entry for breach of condition subsequent, whether here-
tofore or hereafter created, where the condition has not been broken
shall be valid for a longer period than thirty years from the date of
the creation of the condition or possibility of reverter. If such a pos-
sibility of reverter or right of entry or re-entry is created to endure
for a longer period than thirty years, it shall be valid for thirty years."
58 31 NEB. L. REV. 201 at 209 (1951).
59 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450 (1871).
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public. Thus while these reversionary interests may constitute
an unreasonable restraint on alienation, it may be argued that
the nuisance, if any, is private, disturbing only those who derive
title under restricted deeds. 60
IV. DOES THE REVERTER ACT REPEAL EXISTING
NEBRASKA LAW?
Under § 76-10761 future interests are alienable. However the
Reverter Act, § 76-299, declares that a possibility of reverter is
a future interest but is not alienable.6 2 Does § 76-299 then repeal
§ 76-107 by implication? Although the Nebraska Constitution 3
states that no law shall be amended unless set out in the new
law which repeals or amends it, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has held that if an act is "complete and independent in itself"
it may repeal or amend existing statutes without controverting
the constitution. 64
A law might be regarded as "complete and independent" if
(1) the conflict between the two acts arises only incidentally and
the later law treats of a different subject, or (2) if the new law
provides rules completely regulating the general subject matter
with which it is concerned. 65 Under both tests the Reverter Act
would appear to be "complete and independent." Would § 76-299
then be held to repeal § 76-107, thus leaving the alienability of
future interests other than possibilities of reverter in doubt? Or
could a logical basis be found to merely amend the former statute
by repeal to exclude possibilities of reverter from the operation
of § 76-107?66
60 Compare Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
61 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-107 (Reissue 1958).
62 Supra note 48.
63 NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14 (1875): " . . no law shall be amended
unless the new act contains the section or sections as amended and the
section or sections so amended shall be repealed."
64 Scott v. Dohrse, 130 Neb. 847, 266 N.W. 709 (1936); State v. Price
127 Neb. 132, 254 N.W. 889 (1934); Live Stock Nat. Bank v. Jackson,
137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. County
Bd. of Dodge County, 48 Neb. 648, 28 N.W.2d 396 (1947).
65 See Merrill, Legislation: Subject, Title and Amendment, 13 NEB. L.
BULL. 95 at 129 and 130 (1935).
66 The repeal of a statute by implication is not favored, and the rule of
implied repeal will not be extended so as to include cases not within
the express or implied intention of the -legislature. See Schafer v.
Schafer, 71 Neb. 708, 99 N.W. 482 (1904). The repugnancy between
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A fee simple determinable revests automatically in the person
holding the reversionary interest.67 The Reverter Act, § 76-2,103,68
seems to distinguish between a reverter and possibilities of re-
verter. If § 76-2103 means a fee simple determinable it would
appear to conflict with the adverse possession statute, 9 since if
the fee simple has already been determined, the adverse posses-
sion statute should govern. Section 76-2,103 of the Reverter Act
demands that action be brought within one year of the effective
date of the act, but the adverse possession statute provides for
a limitation of ten years.70 Should the adverse possession be
repealed by implication because of the conflict with § 76-2,103?
V. IS THE NEBRASKA REVERTER ACT INVALID ON THE
GROUND THAT IT IMPAIRS THE OBLIGATION
OF CONTRACTS?
The obligation of contracts is protected by both the Federal71
and the Nebraska Constitutions.7 2 Since the "obligations of con-
tracts" within the terms of the Federal Constitution refers to legal
obligations which are measured by the law existing at the time
the contract is entered into,73 it must be shown that a valid and
lawful contract is in existence which is subject to impairment.74
The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties
to perform their agreement. The obligations of a contract are
impaired by a law which "renders them invalid, releases or dis-
tinguishes them, or derogates from substantial contractual rights."7 5
Once a valid contract has been entered into, state legislation will
not be enforced which impairs the obligations of the contracts
the later and former act must be wholly irreconcilable in order to
work a repeal of the former. See Central City v. Morquis, 75 Neb. 233,
106 N.W. 221 (1905). Cf. Liske v. State, 119 Neb. 640, 230 N.W. 503
(1930).
67 See 31 NEB. L. REV. 201 at 209 (1952).
6s Supra note 33.
69 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202 (Reissue 1956).
70 Ibid.
71 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 1.
72 NEB. CONST. art. 1I, § 2 (1875).
73 Placek v. Edstrom, 148 Neb. 79, 26 N.W.2d 489 (1947).
74 R-d. See also Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 394
(1908).
75 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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or destroys the means of enforcing the obligations, where the
means of enforcement are part of the contract.7 6
Although reverter rights are not essential to the enforce-
ment of covenants, they are a legal means of enforcement. In
Biltmore Village v. Royal77 the Florida Supreme Court, in hold-
ing the Florida Reverter Act invalid, said that any legislation
which lessens the efficacy of legal means of enforcement is an
impairment of an obligation of contract contrary to constitutional
provisions.78
The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that a legislative
act will not be permitted to operate retrospectively if it impairs
the obligations of contracts or interferes with vested rights.79
Under § 76-2,102 the Nebraska legislature has declared reverter
rights, such as the ones involved in the Biltmore case to be null
and void and of no further effect after they have been in existence
for thirty years. The statute thus purports to take away from
owners of a reverter interest a property right to which they are
by valid contract lawfully entitled. The statute appears to un-
constitutionally impair this contract.8 0
VI. IS THE NEBRASKA REVERTER ACT INVALID ON THE
GROUND THAT IT CONSTITUTES
SPECIAL LEGISLATION?
The Nebraska Constitution provides: 8
The legislature shall not pass any. . . special laws . . . grant-
ing to any corporation, association, or individual any special priv-
ileges, immunity . . . whatever . . . In all other cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be en-
acted.
76 Snyder v. Lincoln, 150 Neb. 581, 35 N.W.2d 483 (1949).
77 71 So.2d 727, (Fla. 1954).
78 Cf. Burrows v. Vanderbergh, 69 Neb. 43, 95 N.W. 57 (1903).
79 City of Omaha v. Glissman, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828 (1949);
Ritter v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Otoe and Johnson Counties, 137 Neb.
866, 291 N.W. 718 (1940); Cassel Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144
Neb. 753, 144 N.W.2d 600 (1944).
so But see Placek v. Edstrom, 151 Neb. 225, 37 N.W.2d 203 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U. S. 892 (1949) where the court stated that private
contract rights must yield to the public welfare where the latter is
appropriately disclosed and defined and the two conflict. Cf. Thomas
v. Sanderlin, 173 N.C. 329, 91 S.E. 1028 (1917).
81 NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18 (1875).
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The Nebraska Reverter Act, § 76-2,104, provides:
[This act] shall not invalidate or affect ... Any ... pos-
sibility of reverter ... contained in any grant ... to any railroad
or other public utility for the establishment and operation of a
transportation system, communication or transmission lines or
public highways.
Even a reasonable classification of persons and corporations may
not be upheld unless there are actual differences surrounding the
members of the class relative to the subject of the legislation. 82
However, if the class has a substantial attribute which requires
legislation which would be unnecessary for those outside the
class,8 3 differences in circumstances will justify distinctive legis-
lation.84 Designation of railroads and public utilities are upheld
if made pursuant to a public purpose which has a rational basis.85
In Boston & Albany Railroad v. Reardon8 6 the court held valid a
statute providing that railroad property may not be acquired by
adverse possession. The court noted that "the real estate of
railroads is in a sense impressed with a public use . . . Their op-
eration to a considerable extent is regulated by public authorities
"87
The possible denial of equal protection8 8 suggested by § 76-
2,104 appears justified by the public interest and differences in
circumstances on which a reasonable classification may be based.8 9
VII. ARE THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVERTER ACT
CAPABLE OF SERVERANCE IF A PORTION
OF THE ACT IS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The Reverter Act, § 76-2,105,9 0 purports to save the remainder
of the act in the event that any of the provisions are declared
82 Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N.W.2d 664 (1945).
83 Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 77 N.W.2d
862 (1956).
84 Dorrance v. Douglas County, 149 Neb. 685, 32 N.W.2d 202 (1948).
85 16A C. J. S., Constitutional Law § 465 (1956).
86 226 Mass. 286, 115 N.E. 408 (1917).
87 Id. at 288, 115 N.E. 408 at 410.
-1 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89 See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
90 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76- 2,105 (Supp.1959) provides: "If any provi-
sions of [this act] or the application of any provision thereto to any
property, person, or circumstance is held to be invalid, such provision
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invalid. Generally a statute in conflict with the Constitution
yields only to the extent of the repugnancy."' However, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that: 92
Where sections constituting an inducement for the passage of
an act are unconstitutional, the entire act must fall, notwithstand-
ing the savings clause.
Thus it would appear that if the retroactive portions of §§ 76-2,102
and 2,103 were held unconstitutional, the purpose of the Act, which
is to eliminate stale reverters, would be defeated. It is arguable
then that these sections were the principal inducement for the
entire act, and that the legislature might never have passed the act"ia
without the sections.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Due to the definite public interest in removing possibilities
of reverter and rights of re-entry as a bar to the marketability of
land, it is not inconceivable that the Nebraska Supreme Court
would view the curtailed interests as mere expectancies and hold
the Reverter Act constitutional either in whole or part, notwith-
standing existing authority that a possibility of reverter is a vested
interest.
Because of the many grave doubts of constitutionality raised
by the act, no assurance of its validity can be given until it is
tested and a judicial determination is made. An interpretation
by the Nebraska Supreme Court might not provide a final answer.
As shown by Shelly v. Kramer,9" the United States Supreme Court
might properly review action by state courts involving restriction
of real property interests within the state.
Robert M. Zuber, '61
as to such property, person, or circumstance shall be deemed to be
exised from [this actJ and the invalidity thereof as to such property,
persons or circumstances shall not affect any of the other provisions
of [this act] or the application of such provision to property, persons,
or circumstances other than those as to which it is invalid, and [this
act] shall be applied and shall be effective in every situation so far
as its constitutionality extends."
91 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Sprague, 69 Neb. 48, 95 N.W. 46 (1903).
92 Laverty v. Cochran, 132 Neb. 118, 127, 271 N.W. 354, 359 (1937).
See also State v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1, 122 N.W. 473 (1909); State v.
Price, 129 Neb. 433, 261 N.W. 894 (1935).
93 The savings clause is merely an aid to judicial interpretation, and is
not an inexorable command. See Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424, 255
N.W. 551 (1934).
94 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
